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ABSTRACT 
In the fall of 2008, the United States and the rest of the world experienced significant 
financial turmoil. The financial industry as we knew it crumbled before our eyes. After 
experiencing this event and the media's fragmented and inconsistent coverage of it, I felt an 
interesting topic to look into was the financial press' failed coverage of the finance industry, 
both today and in the past. In looking at this event, I will focus on both the financial press that 
failed to cover the happenings of the financial industry, as well as those that did recognize the 
issue at hand. In doing this, I will include a content analysis of the relevant sections of The 
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. In addition, I will also look into past financial 
crises, including the Enron scandal, the Savings and Loan crisis, and the Technology Bubble 
to see if the financial press' recent failure is the continuation of a long trend. After discussing 
the fragmented nature of the financial press, I will then discuss why the financial press had 
little effect on individuals, despite some actually good coverage existing. In discussing this 
issue, I will focus on topics such as the media’s lack of objectivity and the audience's 
unwillingness to accept the situations they are presented with. Finally, I will suggest ways to 
rectify this situation, such as news consumers becoming more media literate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in 1986, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, a price-weighted average of 30 
significant stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq that is generally 
thought to reflect the overall performance of the market, the index has had a number of 
historic down years. For example, in 1907 the index lost 37.7%, and in 1931 the index lost 
52.7% (Hulbert). However, in recent years, the market has set record highs and consumers 
have become accustomed to “easy money,” expecting loans even if their credit quality is poor. 
As a result, lending practices have become extremely lax and average American consumers 
have leveraged themselves to the brink of destruction. Under these conditions, Americans like 
Clarence Nathan, whose house was in foreclosure and did not have full-time employment, but 
“sounded like a nice guy,” received a loan for $450,000. Moreover, when asked if he would 
have lent himself this money, he replied, “I wouldn’t have loaned me the money. And nobody 
I know would have loaned me the money. I know guys who are criminals who wouldn’t loan 
me that, and they break kneecaps” (Carr). Thus, a disconnect in the lending markets has 
undoubtedly developed during these years, and the subprime mortgage crisis was its eventual 
result.  
In 2008, the effects of faulty lending became obvious for the first time as the subprime 
mortgage mess began to unfold due to a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures in the United States and the corresponding impact these events had for banks 
around the globe. Although the severity of the subprime mortgage mess was becoming 
increasingly clear because of the number of defaults, the media failed to provide substantial 
and accurate coverage of this event. Moreover, when the media did provide coverage of the 
financial crisis of 2008, it was often too late and extremely fragmented. The failure of the 
media, however, was not confined to the financial crisis of 2008. When looking at past crises 
in the financial industry, including the downfall of Enron, the burst of the Technology Bubble, 
and the Savings and Loan Crisis, it is evident that this has been an ongoing trend. The media 
have consistently failed to provide adequate coverage of catastrophic events in the investment 
industry.  However, although it is evident that the coverage of financial crisis has been 
fragmented and often inaccurate, some coverage of these events did exist. Therefore, what 
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then is really the problem? How is it possible that investors and the public at large have 
repeatedly been caught off-guard by these events? In this report I will not only cover the 
media’s failed coverage of the financial crisis of 2008, and past crises including the downfall 
of Enron, the Technology Bubble, and the Savings and Loan Crisis, but I will also look at 
what other factors are at play and what consumers can do to prevent these failures in the 
future. 
COVERAGE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES OF 2008 
When looking at the months leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, it is evident that the 
media’s coverage was inadequate. During this time, coverage of the industry was minimal 
despite increasing indicators pointing towards a downfall of a number of long-standing 
financial institutions and the eventual onset of the financial crisis. The media neglected to 
focus on the issue regardless of the damaging impact a downturn in the investment industry 
would have on the public. Furthermore, not only did the media provide extremely limited 
coverage of the financial crisis, but the sparse coverage that did exist was insufficient. The 
coverage provided was often inaccurate, frequently consisting of diluted explanations of the 
situation and biased reports. Furthermore, the information provided was often fragmented and 
underestimated the severity of the situation. Consequently, due to the actions of the media 
during this event, the coverage of the financial crisis was insufficient, and it ultimately 
resulted in the public being severely harmed by the actions of the financial industry. 
During the meltdown of the financial markets, reporters were extremely cautious in how they 
presented the issue. However, reporters covering this event were not overly cautious “because 
reporters should always choose their words with care, but because financial companies are 
‘uniquely vulnerable’ to a ‘loss of confidence’ due to rumor, speculation, and fear” (Jackson). 
Thus, reporters did not want to be seen as creating a self-fulfilling prophecy; reporters did not 
want financial institutions to fail because they implied there was the potential for this to 
happen. However, in using this increased level of caution, reporters ultimately did not fulfill 
their designated roll of accurately informing the public. The public during this time was 
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presented with imprecise information that did not accurately reflect the severity of the issues 
surrounding the financial industry.  
Because of their ability to cripple the financial industry, reporters during the financial crisis of 
2008 did not provide an accurate description of the turmoil within the investment world.  As 
Richard Perez-Pena stated in an article for The New York Times, “So in most news, stocks 
have ‘slid’ and markets ‘gyrated’ but not ‘crashed.’ Companies have ‘tottered’ and ‘struggled’ 
rather than moved toward failure and bankruptcy” (Perez-Pena). Thus, in order to downplay 
the severity of the situation, reporters chose less aggressive words to describe the ongoing 
events. Furthermore, as Ali Velshi, a senior business correspondent at CNN, also stated, “’If 
someone wants to say the markets are in a free fall, we’ll discuss it first [in production 
meetings],’ he said, ‘and the outcome is most likely to be a change in wording’” (Perez-Pena). 
Subsequently, as Velshi suggests, reporters would actively change descriptions of events in 
order to help minimize the apparent severity. As a result, although reporters may help 
minimize the potential for greater financial turmoil by using less severe descriptions of events 
in the financial industry, these actions ultimately result in reporters doing the public a 
disservice. As reporters, they are supposed to be loyal to the public; the goal of reporters 
should be to present unbiased, factual information to their viewers and readers. However, 
because reporters during this time were more concerned with protecting the well-being of 
financial institutions, they dismissed their allegiance to the public and aligned themselves 
with the interests of financial institutions. Ultimately, because of the actions of the media, the 
public was not presented with information that truly depicted the condition of the financial 
industry.   
Not only does the use of  less aggressive terminology to describe the occurrence of events in 
the investment industry result in the media betraying their allegiance to the public, but it also 
brings about the question: “Who’s job is it to tell the public not to panic?” Currently, “’panic’ 
heads the list of words that major news organizations have avoided using because they are 
seen as potentially self-fulfilling” (Perez-Pena). The media refrains from describing a 
situation as “panic-ridden” in an attempt to forego increased levels of panic. However, as 
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Andrew Serwer, the managing editor of Fortune magazine states, “How do you say ‘There’s 
panic out there, but don’t panic?’ And is it even our responsibility to say ‘Don’t panic’?” 
(Perez-Pena). Thus, although the media attempt to mitigate the level of panic that occurs, is 
this even their responsibility? The role of the media is to present the public with unbiased, 
factual information. Thus, rephrasing and reconstructing information in order to prevent panic 
is not part of the essential role the media are supposed to fulfill. It is the media’s job to 
provide information, and they should not be held responsible for the reaction of the public to 
that information. Therefore, in being overly concerned with the reaction of the public when 
describing topics such as Lehman Brothers’ dire financial situation, the media diverted from 
their primary responsibility and assumed a role that was not theirs to fill.  
In addition to the media’s understatement of the financial industry’s condition, the 
mainstream media failed to provide extensive coverage as well. Although investing has 
become increasingly commonplace among Americans in recent years due to improved 
technology and an increase in the usage of 401(k)s, financial news has remained relatively 
uncovered among mainstream media; mainstream media have remained overwhelmingly 
concerned with covering topics such as the winner of this season’s American Idol or when the 
newest version of Apple’s iPhone will be released. Furthermore, mainstream media’s lack of 
coverage was not simply because no media outlets were aware of the situation. As Jim 
Impoco, a reporter for The New York Times, stated  
Even though many financial threats the world faced in recent years were hiding in plain sight – in the pages 
of the business press – the broader media’s longstanding indifference to economic views helped keep it 
safely out of the public dialogue (Impoco).  
Thus, mainstream media’s failure to cover the impending downfall of the financial industry 
was not the result of lack of knowledge; it was the result of lack of concern and interest. 
Mainstream media’s belief that more “entertaining” topics such as celebrity gossip and 
professional sports are more newsworthy than the looming demise of major financial 
institutions effectively resulted in many consumers remaining blissfully unaware of the crisis 
in the investment industry until it was too late. Ultimately, many consumers were not aware of 
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the situation until they had already lost a significant percentage of their savings. 
Consequently, it is essential that mainstream media incorporate investment and economic 
news into their daily broadcasts in order to ensure that society is not reliant on sources such as 
“The Daily Show to take down the next Enron or smoke out the next Bernie Madoff”  
(Impoco). 
Although the financial press did provide slightly more insight into the financial crisis than did 
the mainstream media, the financial press’ tone when it actually did provide coverage also 
created mixed signals for the general public. As Ben Steverman, a columnist for Business 
Week stated, “The media can contribute to ‘huge swings in optimism and pessimism by 
investors’” (Steverman). When conditions seem good, analysts are often excessively 
optimistic; whereas, “when things go sour, they outdo each other telling people how bad 
things could get” (Steverman). Thus, although the financial press did provide some insight 
into the events leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, the tone used to describe these events 
was often misleading. The tone of an article or broadcast can lead investors to believe that 
something is better or worse than it actually is. Therefore, the emotion of reporters when 
relaying messages to the public during this time ultimately played a role in the failure of the 
media to accurately convey the situation.  
Not only did the media’s tone during the coverage of the financial crisis of 2008 skew the 
information, but the biased nature of the media also played a role in making that coverage 
insufficient. Following the downfall of a number of major financial institutions and the onset 
of the bailout initiative by the government, the media immediately threw their support behind 
the bailout. In an instant, the “media decided that anything that the Bush administration and 
the congressional leadership viewed as necessary to pass the bill was acceptable behavior” 
(Baker and Warner). Despite the fact that the bailout bill was such an important piece of 
legislation, the media did not place intense scrutiny on the comments and actions made by 
those involved in developing the legislation. The media effectively accepted the information 
they were given at face value and failed to press for additional information. Moreover, the 
media’s treatment of those individuals opposed to the bill further enforced their biased 
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viewpoint of the bailout. Critics of the bill during this time were treated as if they were 
“unthinking and ill-educated, even though this group included many of the country’s most 
prominent economists” (Baker and Warner). Additionally, on September 24th, 2008 when 230 
economists signed an open letter protesting the bailout, the event received almost no coverage 
by the mainstream media. Finally, the media’s bias was further enforced by their support of 
the Bush Administration’s scare tactics. For example, after the initial defeat of the bailout 
package on September 29th, 2008, The Financial Times published an article titled “Congress 
Decides It Is Worth Risking Depression.” In the article, the author referred to a repeat of the 
Great Depression as a consequence of not passing the bailout bill. Using this threat, however, 
was unfounded; it would take a full decade of extremely poorly guided economic policy to 
even come close to repeating the Great Depression. The media, continuing their biased nature, 
did not bring this fact to the public’s attention.  Instead, they reinforced the threat’s impact 
and did not bring the public’s attention to the government’s “fear-mongering.” Overall, the 
biased nature of media when covering the financial crisis of 2008 was a leading factor 
contributing to the event’s poor coverage.  
Another contributing factor to the failure in coverage of the financial crisis of 2008 was the 
inability of the media to maintain a stance for a significant period of time; the media 
constantly “flip flopped” their viewpoints on the issue. For example, during the week of 
September 15th, 2008, many of the United States’ economic leaders completely reversed their 
viewpoints regarding the condition of the financial industry. During this time, economists 
“went from assuring us that the economy was just fine to telling us that the bottom was about 
to fall out and a second Great Depression loomed just over the horizon” (Baker and Warner). 
Thus, the media effectively reversed their standpoint on the economy for no apparent reason, 
leaving the public confused and unsure of the future. In doing so, the media not only tarnished 
their reputation as a reputable source of information, but they also failed to provide the public 
with accurate information. The media should stand behind their initial viewpoint unless 
presented with significant information that refutes it.  
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In addition, the media’s inability to maintain a solid viewpoint surrounding the financial 
industry’s condition, the media’s tendency to consistently underestimate the potential 
“correction” in the market also contributed to the inconsistent coverage of the financial crisis. 
Prior to the onset of the demise of the financial industry, “corporate media had already 
established themselves as cheerleaders for the thriving housing market” (Casidy). Thus, 
because of their position, the media tirelessly supported the housing boom, even when signs 
of instability and an emerging housing bubble became evident. As Michael E. Kanell stated in 
an article for the Atlanta Journal Constitution in 2003, “Even when they did acknowledge the 
posibility of a bubble, given record home prices, media reassured the public that it wasn’t 
something to be terribly concnerned about”  (Casidy). Furthermore, in 2005 when 
construction declined substantially, most media reports continued to deny the existence of a 
housing bubble. The media continued to promote and prop-up the housing market despite 
rising evidence that its continued expansion was unsustainable. As a result, when the housing 
market eventually crashed and the start of the financial crisis of 2008 began to unfold, 
investors were taken by surprise and many lost signficant investments. Thus, had the media 
accurately reported the condition of the housing market, the public would have had a more 
informed understanding of the issue.  
Lastly, although the media did provide limited insight into the issues surrounding the financial 
industry, what insight they did provide was too late to be effective. For example, while Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were participating in risky investments and the investment banks were 
becoming overextended, there were a small number of incremental stories discussing these 
issues. However, although there were a few whistle-blowing articles, “the business press 
never conveyed a real sense of alarm until institutions began to collapse” (Gasparino). 
Therefore, when the media actually began providing coverage of the issue, it was too late for 
the general public. Many people had already lost significant investments before they were 
even aware of the turmoil in the financial industry. Thus, “as in the savings-and-loan scandal 
of the late 1980s, the press was a day late and several dollars short” (Roush).  
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Overall, the inadequate coverage of the media during the financial crisis of 2008 resulted in 
harmful consequences for the general public. The media’s tendency to use less severe 
wording when describing an event and their tendency to underestimate the severity of a 
potential “correction” resulted in an essentially unaware public. Furthermore, the fragmented 
and biased nature of the media’s coverage further contributed to the public’s lack of 
knowledge. Lastly, although there was some coverage of the events unfolding in the 
investment industry, this coverage was often too late to be effective. By the time the public 
was aware of the situation, individuals had already suffered the effects.  
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
This section focuses on the method used in the content analysis portion of my quantitative 
research, as well as the results of my analysis.  
Content Analysis Method 
In order to quantify the financial press’ substandard coverage of the financial crisis of 2008, a 
content analysis of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times was performed. The first 
step in the analysis process was choosing a specific event to examine. Ultimately, the 
declaration of bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 was chosen because it 
was the first major financial institution to fail. Thus, Lehman’s failure represents the true 
culmination of the financial crisis. 
Following the selection of an event to analyze, the newspapers for the analysis were then 
chosen. In choosing the newspapers for examination, circulation figures for daily newspapers 
around the world were retrieved. On the List of the Top-100 Paid for Newspapers in 2008, 
compiled by the World Association of Newspapers, The Wall Street Journal and The New 
York Times had the highest circulation figures in the United States, behind only USA Today. 
The Wall Street Journal had 2.012 million readers, and The New York Times had 1.038 
million readers. Although USA Today had the highest circulation figure with 2.293 million 
readers, the newspaper was not chosen because it does not include a large business section 
(The World Association of Newspapers). Furthermore, The New York Times and The Wall 
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Street Journal were also chosen because of their dominance in the business journalism 
industry. As stated by Chris Roush in the article “Unheeded Warnings,”  
The powerful players in business journalism include the Wall Street Journal, the business sections of the 
New York Times and the Washington Post, and business magazines such as BusinessWeek and Fortune. 
These are the news outlets with the power to direct the conversation (Roush). 
Thus, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times were chosen on the basis of 
circulation figures and prominence within the business journalism industry.  
After determining which newspapers to utilize, the time period for analysis was then selected. 
Due to the short life-span of news topics, a time period of two weeks was ultimately chosen. 
As Carl Stepp states in the article Moving at Reckless Speed, “Today’s news media move at 
such ‘reckless speed’” (Stepp, 2008). Therefore, it was likely that the Lehman crisis would 
only be mentioned during a short period before the actual crash. 
In addition to determining the period of analysis, it was also necessary to determine the 
relevant sections of each newspaper to examine. Determining the relevant sections was 
necessary in order to ensure that the results of the analysis were not skewed. Had irrelevant 
sections, such as the Leisure & Arts section of The Wall Street Journal, been included, the 
total number of articles used for the calculations would not have been accurate. For example, 
the percent of total articles that at least mentioned Lehman would have been smaller because 
the total number of articles the percent was calculated from would have been larger. After 
manually reviewing both newspapers, the following sections were determined to be relevant: 
Wall Street Journal 
A: General News 
B: Marketplace 
C: Money & Investing 
B: Money & Investing (Weekend Journal) 
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The New York Times 
A1-A5: Top Stories/General News 
B: Business Day 
BU: Business Weekend (Sunday Edition) 
In determining the relevant sections, it was ultimately decided not to include the 
“International” sections of either newspaper. This decision was based on the fact that within 
the business sections, an international business section was included. Therefore, any relevant 
international business news would be found in this section and not the actual international 
section of the newspaper.  
Following the selection of the relevant sections for each newspaper, the relevant articles were 
then coded and tallied in order to provide the basis for the desired information. Articles were 
determined to be relevant if they merely mentioned the difficulties Lehman Brothers was 
facing. Thus, in order to search for all articles mentioning Lehman’s issues during the two 
weeks prior to the company’s bankruptcy announcement, Proquest was utilized. However, in 
counting the articles, it was necessary to read through each article in order to ensure that the 
article was not merely mentioning a Lehman analyst covering another event in the investment 
industry, and that the article was truly referencing the impending Lehman crisis. Whereas, 
relying solely on the total number of articles the Proquest search provided would have been 
detrimental to the accuracy of the data. While tallying the articles, they were also coded 
according to the following categories: 
Total Number of Articles that Merely Mention Lehman vs. Total Number of Articles 
Discussing Solely Lehman 
Total Number of Positive Articles vs. Total Number of Negative Articles 
Total Number of Times Lehman Articles were on the Front Page 
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Total Number of Times the Word “Bankruptcy” was Mentioned 
Again, reading each article was necessary in order to ensure the articles were coded correctly. 
For example, whether an article was discussing Lehman in a positive or negative light cannot 
be determined without first reading the article.  
After the coding and tallying of all relevant articles found on Proquest that mentioned the 
Lehman controversy  in the two weeks immediately before the company’s fall, it was 
necessary to determine how many stories overall appeared in each paper. In that way, the 
proportion of all stories in the relevant sections that were in fact Lehman-oriented could be 
computed. To do this, I selected a seven-day sample of each of my target newspapers and 
manually counted all stories in the relevant sections. In this way I was sure to allow for 
variations that might have occurred for different days, weekend versus weekday, for example. 
Once this number was obtained, I multiplied it by two, which gave me an appropriate 
denominator for two weeks of coverage. 
Lastly, after compiling the necessary data, Microsoft Excel was then utilized to perform 
analysis calculations. Excel was utilized to compute calculations such as the total percentage 
of times that Lehman was at least mentioned in the relevant sections of the newspapers, as 
well as to construct graphs in order to better visually represent the data.  
Overall, by utilizing the aforementioned method, it was possible to gather statistically valid 
and representative data that can be used to quantify the media’s fragmented coverage of the 
financial crisis of 2008. 
Content Analysis Results 
Based on the analysis of the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times performed during 
the two weeks prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a number of conclusions can be 
drawn that support the notion that the financial press’ coverage of the financial crisis of 2008 
was inconsistent and minimal.  
When comparing the total number of articles that at least mention the situation surrounding 
Lehman Brothers to the total number of articles in the relevant sections of both newspapers 
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during the two weeks prior to the collapse, it is evident that the coverage of the event was 
sparse at best. Of the 1,108 articles located in the relevant section of the newspapers during 
this time, only an average of 7.15% mentioned Lehman’s distraught financial situation. 
(Please see the chart below.) 
Articles that At least Mentioned Lehman in the 
Relevant Sections of the Newspapers 
WSJ NY Times 
Lehman  58 24 
Total 730 378 
Percent 7.95% 6.35% 
Total Percent 7.15% 
 
This can further be broken down by newspaper, with 7.95% coming from The Wall Street 
Journal and 6.35% coming from The New York Times. Thus, it is obvious that the newspapers 
did not spend significant time and resources to cover, and ultimately notify the public, the 
crisis at hand.  
Not only does the fact that only an average of 7.15% of the articles within two of the most 
prominent business newspapers actually discussed Lehman support the notion that the 
coverage of the financial press is inconsistent, but the extent that these articles cover the topic 
supports this conclusion as well. Of the 7.95% of articles in The Wall Street Journal that 
actually mention Lehman Brothers, 56.86% of these articles merely mentioned the situation 
once. Therefore, the issue was simply mentioned in passing, and it is easy for the reader to 
disregard its importance. The remaining 43.14% of the relevant articles discussed solely 
Lehman Brothers; the articles were dedicated to discussing the situation at hand in-depth. 
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Similar to The Wall Street Journal, the extent to which Lehman Brothers was discussed in 
The New York Times also varied. In The New York Times, 33.33% of the articles merely 
mentioned the situation, and only 66.67% of the articles discussed solely Lehman Brothers. 
Therefore, based on the minimal percentage of articles, both in The Wall Street Journal and 
The New York Times, that actually performed an in-depth analysis of the situation, the 
existence of minimal media coverage is enforced.  
In addition to differing in the extent of coverage, the overall evaluations of the articles also 
differed as well. Of the total number of articles across both publications that at least 
mentioned the situation surrounding Lehman Brothers, 18.29% of the articles were positive. 
Moreover, of the 58 articles in The Wall Street Journal that at least mentioned Lehman 
Brother’s situation, 22.41% of the articles were positive. For example, merely two days before 
Lehman produced the company’s bankruptcy announcement, an article in The Wall Street 
Journal stated that Goldman Sachs continued to maintain a “buy” rating on shares of Lehman 
Brothers. By standing behind this rating, Goldman was effectively announcing its continued 
confidence in the company. In addition to positive articles being published in The Wall Street 
Journal, 8.33% of the articles that at least mentioned Lehman Brothers in The New York 
Times were also positive. For example, on September 4th, 2008, an article titled “Investor 
Jitters Produce Mixed Markets” stated,  
One bright spot in the market Wednesday was the troubled financial sector, which drew some bargain 
hunters because of positive news on a few big names: the Ambac Financial Group, Freddie Mac and 
Lehman Brothers Holdings (The Associated Press) 
Thus, the article was promoting the recent positive news surrounding Lehman, and it was 
reflecting on investors still showing interest in investing in the company.  
Along with varying article content, the number of times that articles admitted the potential for 
Lehman to be forced into bankruptcy also reinforces the substandard nature of the financial 
press. Of the 82 total articles that mention the Lehman Brothers crisis, the word “bankruptcy” 
was only used twice, once in The Wall Street Journal and once in The New York Times. 
Moreover, the remaining articles utilized other, less severe, words to describe Lehman 
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of openly stating the possibility of Lehman Brothers declaring bankruptcy. For example, in 
the article “Lehman’s Assurances Ring Hollow,” Floyd Norris states, “It is sad to watch 
Lehman Brothers, one of the grand old names of Wall Street and before that a cotton and 
coffee merchant from Alabama, struggling to avoid collapse” (Norris). Not only does the 
author of the article refrain from using the word bankruptcy, but he also softens the severity of 
the situation by referring to Lehman as one of the “grand old names of Wall Street.”  Thus, by 
utilizing less obvious words to describe the situation instead of stating the possibility of 
bankruptcy, the vast majority of the articles discussing the Lehman Brothers’ crisis do the 
consumers of the financial press a distinct injustice; the financial press did not do an adequate 
job of informing consumers of the severity of Lehman Brothers’ situation.  
Not only was the word “bankruptcy” seldom mentioned in articles discussing Lehman 
Brothers, but articles discussing the crisis were rarely placed on the front page of either 
newspaper as well. In The Wall Street Journal, only 8 articles discussing Lehman Brothers 
during the two weeks prior to the company’s crash were found on the front page. In addition, 
in The New York Times, only 6 articles were found on the front page during the two weeks 
prior to the crash. Furthermore, as shown by the chart below, not only did very few articles 
appear on the front page, but articles about the situation did not begin appearing on the front 
page until September 9th.  
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Therefore, articles regarding the topic did not even appear on the front page until the Tuesday 
prior to Lehman’s collapse; articles were on the front page for less than a week. Thus, the 
press did not adequately identify the situation; the impending downfall of a global financial 
institution should receive front-page covereage for more than a few days.  
Lastly, the overall timeline of the financial press’ coverage of the crisis is also indicative of its 
inadequacy. The impending downfall of a major financial insitution that is linked to 
economies around the world is clearly an important issue; however, as the graph below 
shows,  coverage of the issue was minimal until September 9th.  
 
Until this point, both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times only included an 
average of one to two articles a day about the issue. Therefore, it is evident that neither 
publication felt the issue was worthy of coverage and did not bother to inform consumers 
about the problem. Furthermore, it is also unimaginable to assume that the financial press did 
not cover the issue because they were unaware of the situation. As the article Lehman’s Fate 
Spurs Emergency Session; Wall Street Titans Seek Ways to Stem Widening Crisis states, 
“Lehman’s troubles have also been known for a while, giving market participants ‘time to 
prepare,’ according to those familiar with the government’s thinking” (Paletta). Individuals 
closely tied to the investments industry were aware of the issues surrounding Lehman 
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Brothers; therefore, renowned financial newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal and The 
New York Times should have been aware of the concern.  
Overall, the results clearly indicate that the financial press’ coverage of major events in the 
investment industry, such as the downfall of Lehman Brothers, has been inconsistent and 
incomplete. Not only did articles in both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times 
fail to convey the severity of the situation, but the coverage did not appear until the very last 
possible moment. Both newspapers only provided relatively signifant coverage of the issue 
during the week immediately prior to the event. Thus, in the end, as shown by The Wall Street 
Journal and The New York Times, the financial press has not done an adequate job of covering 
this major event in the investment industry. 
COVERAGE OF EARLIER FINANCIAL CRISES 
The media’s failure in the financial crisis of 2008, may well be a duplicate of their 
performance in past financial crises including the downfall of Enron, the burst of the 
Technology Bubble, and the Savings and Loan Crisis.  
Enron 
During Enron’s reign, the media praised Enron, despite rising evidence of an underlying 
scandal. For six straight years, Fortune magazine named Enron the most innovative company 
in America. The New York Times called it “a model for the new American workplace,” and 
The Dallas Morning News described it as “one of the most envied and respected corporations 
in the United States” (Shaw). However, although at times the praise seemed warranted, the 
media failed to maintain an objective viewpoint and look behind Enron’s appeared success. 
Ultimately, “instead of scrutinizing Enron’s accounts, [the media] acted as a cheerleader all 
the way to the end,” and the media’s coverage became inconsistent and disconnected 
(Maidment).  
While praising Enron’s performance, the media ignored a number of red flags that were 
hiding in plain sight. Not only was there a long-lasting, continuous discrepancy between 
Enron’s profits and its cash flow, but the company’s return on investment was also extremely 
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low for a company with that much risk associated with it. Furthermore, the company’s 
financial statements were incomprehensible, even to many of the investment industry’s top 
analysts. Additionally, many of the company’s top executives were repeatedly selling huge 
amounts of the company’s stock, which should have been a clear indicator that something was 
wrong with the company. Not only were top executives selling large amounts of the 
company’s stock, but a large number of senior executives were leaving the company as well; 
68 senior executives left during an 18 month span. Thus, based on the events that took place, 
the media should have been more aware of the impending downfall of Enron. 
As a result of the media ignoring the many signs that indicated Enron was not as successful as 
it appeared, the media were extremely late in covering the demise of Enron. Despite many 
warnings signs, the company was still rated as a “buy” by a number of major brokerage firms 
just a few weeks before it declared bankruptcy (Myatt). Subsequently, many investors were in 
shock when Enron declared bankruptcy because multiple analysts, who were believed to be 
reputable, claimed the company was a strong investment choice. Not only were major 
brokerage firms publicizing false buy recommendations, but many major business 
publications were also praising Enron’s senior executives during this time as well. For 
example, in a Business 2.0 column, “Erick Schonfield acknowledges having made Enron’s 
chief executive Jeffrey Skilling its cover boy for the August/September 2001 issue, a week 
before he resigned” (Behr). Thus, the media were praising Enron’s senior executives while 
they were single-handedly creating a scandal that would ultimately result in the largest 
corporate bankruptcy in the history of the United States. Additionally, the media still did not 
actively cover Enron even when the company began losing massive amounts of money. The 
LA Times, for example, did not publish a story on Enron’s third-quarter loss until two days 
after Enron reported the information. Furthermore, even when the LA Times finally did 
publish the information, the publication only dedicated four sentences in the markets roundup 
portion of the newspaper. Thus, it was obvious that the LA Times did not feel this event was 
worthy of extensive coverage, and the “mainstream media certainly waited – too long” 
(Myatt).  
Where Were the Media in the Financial Crisis of 2008, and Have We Seen This Trend 
Before? 
Senior Capstone Project for Margaret Dickinson 
- 19 - 
Not only was there a significant lack of coverage prior to Enron’s fall, but when Enron finally 
declared bankruptcy, the majority of the media did not consider this big news. Despite the fact 
that the collapse of Enron represented the downfall of the seventh-largest company in the 
United States, many of the largest media outlets barely even mentioned the event. Following 
the announcement, ABC, CBS, and NBC only dedicated two sentences during the evening 
news to the event. Not only was the event not actively promoted on the evening news, but 
Enron’s bankruptcy did not make the front page of the Washington Post, Boston Globe, 
Philadelphia Inquirer, USA Today, Denver Post, or Detriot Free Press. Ultimately, despite 
Enron’s declaration of bankruptcy, the media did not immediately provide extensive coverage 
of the event, and widespread coverage did not occur until information regarding Arthur 
Anderson, Enron’s accounting firm, and a potential political scandal were uncovered.  
In addition, not only was the coverage of Enron’s downfall delayed and sparse, but the media 
also presented conflicting viewpoints. For example, the treatment of Ken Lay, the chairman of 
Enron, was handled differently by different media groups. In Houston, where Lay was one of 
the most charitable donors to the city, the media scarcely focused blame on him. However, 
Houston’s media did place extensive blame on Enron’s other senior executives. In contrast to 
Houston’s sparing of Lay, Mother Jones, an alternative media source, consistently printed 
articles discussing Lay as one of the central figures of the scandal. Thus, there was 
discrepancy among media groups as to the extent of Lay’s involvement in the scandal. In 
addition to the discrepancy regarding Lay’s involvement, the coverage surrounding the 
potential political scandal associated with Enron also differed between mainstream and 
alternative media groups. As Jimmy Myatt states in the article “Covering the Enron Story: 
Playing Softball and Playing Catch-Up,” “Most of the mainstream press failed to ask 
questions concerning Enron’s role in setting up the Bush Administration’s energy policy or 
the company’s contributions to the political campaigns of Bush…” (Myatt). In contrast to the 
mainstream media’s coverage, the alternative press, such as Mother Jones and The Nation, 
printed stories on the political scandal as early as 2002. Essentially, the conflicting viewpoints 
of differing media groups served as another means to confuse the public. 
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Along with presenting conflicting viewpoints, the media’s coverage was further substandard 
because they allowed Enron’s management to dictate the information given to the public. In 
order to ensure that the desired message was conveyed to the public, Enron employed big 
lobbying staffs and spent extensive amounts of money on investor and public relations. Enron 
paid influential commentators as much as $50,000 a year to be a member of Ken Lay’s board 
of advisors. With members such as William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, and Paul 
Krugman, an economist and The New York Times columnist, the advisory board was an 
instrumental tool in manipulating the media. Furthermore, Enron’s response to any opposition 
to the company also shaped the information the media presented the public with. For example, 
in response to questions raised by Bethany McLean, a Fortune magazine reporter, Enron did a 
number of things to thwart coverage. To discourage further questions, Jeffrey Skilling, 
Enron’s CEO, called McLean unethical and hung up on her when she called. In addition, Ken 
Lay, the company’s chairman, called Fortune’s managing editor to complain, and the 
company even went as far as to send Andrew Fastow, Enron’s chief financial officer, to New 
York to tell McLean and her editors that Enron was still a healthy, thriving company. As a 
result of Enron’s efforts, the company was effectively able to persuade the media to act as the 
company’s “cheerleaders,” and the vast majority of the public remained unaware of Enron’s 
true condition. 
Following Enron’s declaration of bankruptcy and the onset of scandals involving Arthur 
Anderson and the government, the media attempted to defend their lack of coverage by saying 
Enron’s financials were too complex to decipher. As Jeff Madrick said in the article “Enron, 
the Media and the New Economy,” many journalists attempted to hide “behind the fact that 
the Enron debacle is so complex that the company’s misdeeds could not be readily 
understood” (Madrick). However, this is not a viable excuse. Leading up to Enron’s downfall, 
Enron’s profit margins were visibly low, and the company’s earnings were increasing rapidly 
while the company’s cash flow was not. Thus, although many journalists do not have 
extensive financial backgrounds, these signs should have been clear enough to indicate that 
there was something signficantly wrong with the company, and as the two economists 
Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, stated “while many transactions were concealed, there 
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was enough public information available to raise serious doubt about the credibility of 
Enron’s earnings” (Maidment).  
On the other hand, although the media clearly missed a number of relatively obvious warning 
signs, there were a number of factors that impeded the media’s coverage of Enron. While 
there were some areas within Enron’s financials that indicated the company was not as 
healthy as portrayed, much of Enron’s financials and business practices were “largely 
impenetrable…mind-numbingly complex…deeply frusterating…mysterious” (Shaw). 
Furthermore, when journalists attempted to investigate Enron, they were met with harsh 
opposition. Enron employed an extensive lobbying staff and investor relations department that 
went to  great lengths to suppress any opposition to the company. In addition, another factor 
that contributed to the media’s poor coverage of Enron was the September 11th terrorist 
attacks. Less than one month after Skilling’s resignation, the September 11th terrorist attacks 
occurred; consequently, most news organizations devoted the majority of their efforts and 
resources to covering this event. Lastly, although the coverage of Enron was inconsistent at 
best, it is important to note that there were a few critical articles published before its downfall. 
For example, despite harsh opposition from many of Enron’s top executives, Bethany 
McClean published an article in the March 5, 2001 issue of Fortune entitled, “Is Enron 
Overpriced?” in which she began questioning Enron’s inflated stock price.   
Overall,  the media’s coverage of Enron was subpar at best. Not only did the media blindly act 
as “cheerleaders” for the company, but they ignored a number of obvious warning signs as 
well. Consequently, because the media ignored these early warning signs, they did not cover 
Enron’s downfall until it was too late; many investors had already lost a signifant portion of 
their investment by the time they were aware of Enron’s true condition. Moreover, not only 
were the media slow to report on Enron, but when the media did finally publicize the event, it 
did not receive prime coverage and many conflicting viewpoints were presented. The media 
largely allowed Enron’s management to dictate what information was given to the public, and 
Enron’s management often pressured reporters into presenting only positive information 
about the company. Thus, in the end, as John Olson, an analyst with the Sanders Morris 
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Harris Group, stated, “Enron was great at gaming the system and they gamed us on Wall 
Street. They gamed the media. They gamed their accountants and they may have gamed their 
lawyers. In the end, they may have even gamed each other” (Anderson). 
Technology Bubble & The Savings and Loan Crisis 
In addition to the poor coverage of the media during the downfall of Enron, the media also 
failed in their coverage of the Technology Bubble and the Savings and Loan Crisis. During 
the Technology Bubble, 
The role of the news media in the stock market was not, as commonly believed, simply a 
convenient tool for investors who were reacting directly to the economically significant news 
itself. The media actively shaped public attention and categories of thought, and they created the 
environment within which the stock market events we see are played out (Bhattacharya, Galpin 
and Ray). 
Thus, the media created the context in which the Technology Bubble occurred. Through their 
coverage, the media were able to direct the attention of the public to technology stocks, and 
ultimately convince investors that these stocks were worth investing in. Moreover, not only 
did the media participate in convincing investors to purchase technology stocks, even when 
there was no financial data to support this decision, but the media also produced conflicting 
viewpoints throughout their coverage. As the authors of the article “The  Role of the Media in 
the Internet IPO Bubble” stated, “During the Dot-Com Era, the media tended to be over-
optimistic when prices were rising but over pessimistic when prices were falling” 
(Bhattacharya, Galpin and Ray).  Instead of looking at factual data, the media simply reported 
on the trends occurring in the general marketplace. In doing this, the media failed to provide 
the public with an accurate depiction of what was really occurring within the technology 
industry; they only exacerbated trends that were already occurring by providing additional 
hype.  
Similar to the coverage of the Technology Bubble, the coverage of the Savings and Loan 
Crisis was also substandard at best. During the coverage of the event, there was a blatant bias 
on televised news. When the three major nightly news broadcasts asked a total of 80 on-air 
Where Were the Media in the Financial Crisis of 2008, and Have We Seen This Trend 
Before? 
Senior Capstone Project for Margaret Dickinson 
- 23 - 
sources for their views on the S&Ls between mid-December and mid-February, three-fourths 
were government officials and one-fourth were financial industry spokespersons or private 
analysts. Thus, no public interest spokespersons were given the opportunity to even comment 
on the issue. Furthermore, when Ralph Nader and Jesse Jackson produced reports stating the 
bailout should be the responsibility of the rich because they benefited the most from the 
scandal, the media immediately dismissed the reports. For example, when Nader released the 
report “Report to U.S. Taxpayers on the Savings & Loan Crisis,” it was not covered by any of 
the three nightly news networks and no coverage occurred in the Washington Post or The New 
York Times. In addition to the media’s failure to cover the viewpoints of public interest 
spokespersons and the report’s of political figures such as Ralph Nader, most media also 
failed to point out that the Savings and Loan Crisis was “rooted in financial speculation that 
Reagan policies have encouraged” (Bond).  Thus, the interests of the government were placed 
before the media’s obligation to the public; the media failed to provide the public with 
objective viewpoints in order to benefit parties such as the government. Overall, the media’s 
performance during the Technology Bubble and the Savings and Loan Crisis was 
unimpressive, and they failed to provide the public with accurate information.  
WHAT THEN IS THE PROBLEM? 
Although the coverage of past financial crises has been substandard at best, minimal coverage 
of financial crises has still existed. Therefore, how is it possible that so many consumers were 
unaware of the situation, both during the financial crisis of 2008 and past financial crises? 
Was it only poor coverage, or were there other contributing factors? 
One of the major contributors to the public’s failure to recognize the condition of the financial 
industry is that “the reading public wants to read only what it wants to believe” (Roush). 
During times when the market is performing well and investors are receiving high returns, the 
public is not very receptive to the notion that the market may potentially go down and they 
may no longer see the returns they desire. As Chris Roush states in the article Warnings, “It is 
very hard to get the public’s attention for stories warning of complex financial risks in the 
middle of a roaring, populist bull market”  (Roush). Thus, investors would rather remain 
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blissfully unaware than accept the potential for a decline in the market. Moreover, if the 
public even took the initiative to read an article discussing the potential for a market 
downturn, most “people would have said ‘Ha ha, maybe,’ and gone about their business” 
(Roush).  
Furthermore, a prime example of the public’s refusal to accept negative market outlooks 
during a bull market is evident in the story of Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at 
New York University. In 2006, Roubini gave a speech at the International Monetary Fund 
warning that the United States would experience a burst in the housing bubble, an oil shock, a 
steep decline in consumer confidence, and, ultimately, a profound recession. Upon giving this 
speech, however, the audience laughed at Roubini’s warnings because at the time 
unemployment and inflation was low and the economy was still growing modestly. As a 
result, the audience felt Roubini’s warnings were unfounded, and they did not accept the 
possibility of a downturn in the market. However, in the year following Roubini’s speech, 
subprime mortgage lenders began to declare bankruptcy, hedge funds went under, and the 
stock market declined substantially. Thus, despite the resistance Roubini faced, his 
predictions ultimately became a reality, and, as economist Prakash Loungani stated, “He 
sounded like a madman in 2006, but he was a prophet when he returned in 2007” (Mihm). In 
the end, although the media clearly did not adequately cover past financial crises, it is 
undeniable that the public contributed to its own ignorance. As Andy Serwer, the Managing 
Editor for Fortune stated, “There’s plenty of greed to go around. Everyone’s complicit”; the 
public is perfectly content remaining unaware of a potential market downturn so long as their 
returns remain steady (Writer). 
In addition to the public’s unwillingness to listen to negative news during a bull market, 
another major contributor to this phenomenon is the fact that the audience of the financial 
press is often comprised of the same people that the journalists are writing about. For 
example, during the financial crisis of 2008, “A major part of the problem is that the financial 
journalists who cover Wall Street are used to writing for Wall Street’s customers – the very 
mortgage companies and financial institutions that were raking in millions from the bubble”  
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(Schechter). Thus, in order to please these individuals and promote the sale of financial 
magazines and newspapers, journalists will publish information that places companies and 
organizations in a more favorable light. By creating a more favorable image of these 
organizations, the individuals associated with them are more likely to purchase the 
publication. Therefore, in order to avoid being cast aside within the media industry, much of 
the financial press concedes to the demands of their audience and publishes articles that the 
readers of the financial press find appealing.  
Additionally, the poor coverage of the media is further enhanced by the media’s inherent 
conflict of interest. As seen in recent years, the coverage of the media is often swayed by 
increased compensation. For example, during Enron’s reign, the analysts of many investment 
banks were persuaded to issue favorable reviews in return for investment banking business. 
As David Shaw, a reporter for the LA Times stated,  
Companies such as Enron have considerable leverage over them, saying (implicitly, if not 
explicitly), ‘We support the analysts who support our stock,’ meaning they’ll give their lucrative 
investment banking business to those firms whose analysts issue strong “buy” recommendations 
for their stock  (Shaw). 
Furthermore, the idea that analysts often construct favorable reviews of companies in return 
for monetary compensation is further demonstrated by the large salaries that analysts are paid. 
Analysts are paid exorbitant amounts “not because they write nice reports with glossy covers. 
It’s because they help generate fees for their firms by taking a very, very optimistic view of a 
stock, even if they don’t necessarily believe it” (Shaw). Thus, because analysts have a vested 
interest in the reports they produce, they have a tendency to deviate from the truth and create 
inaccurate reports that better suit their monetary desires. Not only is the media’s conflict of 
interest shown through its performance during Enron’s reign, but many of the investment 
rating agencies, such as Moody’s, acted in this manner as well. The role of investment rating 
agencies is to help investors better evaluate the risk in what they are buying. However, during 
the bull market leading up to the burst of the housing bubble, many of the agencies “either 
underestimated the risk of mortgage debt or simply over-looked its danger so they could rake 
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in large profits during the housing boom” (Morgenson). Thus, as did analysts during the 
Enron scandal, rating agencies, in order to benefit their own agenda, during the financial crisis 
of 2008 also failed to provide investors and the public at large with accurate investment 
information. As a result, although there was the appearance of information, the information 
was of little value to the public because the media simply used it to benefit their own interests.  
However, the media’s conflict of interest extends beyond that of monetary benefits; the media 
have also often trades subservience for access. Alexander Dyck, an economist at the 
University of Toronto, stated that there is a “systemic quid pro quo bias between journalists 
and their sources, whereby journalists receive private information in exchange for a positive 
spin on companies’ news”  (Maidment). Therefore, the media are only relaying the 
information to the public that the organizations want them to hear and any negative news 
remains unheard. Furthermore, the tendency of the media to trade subservience for access is 
also greatly amplified during economic bubbles. Because growth forecasts become 
increasingly important to investors during bubbles, many companies are even more concerned 
with spinning news to show a positive outlook and muting bad news. As a result, companies 
use their ability to restrict journalistic access in order to limit the ability of the media to 
discover potentially damaging information. Thus, journalists are increasingly forced to 
comply with the demands of companies in order to gain information. Overall, “it’s no secret 
that journalists trade access for soft treatment”; the media in today’s society is willing to trade 
objectivity for access to additional information and monetary rewards (Rose). Financial 
reporters became financial stenographers.  
Not only is the media’s coverage compromised by their inherent conflict of interest, but it is 
also tarnished because the media do not often like to admit when they are wrong. As Peter 
Behr stated, “Journalists take pride in finding out answers to questions, not in being stumped 
and misled” (Behr). Thus, the media enjoy touting when they are correct and uncover a 
ground-breaking story, but they have a difficult time accepting their mistakes. As a result, the 
media often have difficulty presenting a new viewpoint when evidence arises in contradiction 
to their initial stance. 
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In addition to the media’s inability to accept failure, their coverage is further deteriorated 
because “the press doesn’t pay as much attention to some of these regulatory issues that have 
more impact on the world” (Kurtz). In American society, the media are often more concerned 
with political stories than business stories, even though events in the business arena often 
have a wide reaching impact on society. For example, during the Enron scandal, the few 
critical pieces that were written before the company declared bankruptcy focused mainly on 
the alleged political scandal associated with the company. As Howard Kurtz states,  
In February, the Los Angeles Times reported on the close ties between Lay and the president, noting that 
Bush had flown on Enron jets during the campaign…In May, the New York Times quoted the federal 
government’s top electricity regulator, Curtis Hebert Jr., as saying Lay had offered to support his continued 
tenure if he changed his views on energy deregulation (Kurtz). 
Furthermore, not only was the coverage prior to Enron’s downfall primarily focused on the 
alleged political scandal, but the extensive amounts of coverage surrounding Enron after its 
declaration of bankruptcy was still largely in regards to the political aspects of the situation. 
As discussed in a television special on PBS in the weeks following Enron’s downfall “it’s 
Enron all the time, thanks to the company’s ties to the Bush administration and its showering 
of campaign money on Capitol Hill” (McLean, Madrick and Allen). Thus, despite the fact that 
Enron’s downfall was the largest corporate bankruptcy in U. S. history, the majority of the 
coverage regarding the event still focused mainly on the ties the government had to Enron.  
Lastly, another major contributor to the media’s inconsistent coverage of financial crises has 
been the decline in the fortunes of the newspaper industry. In 2008 alone, the newspaper 
industry lost 13,000 jobs. Consequently, not only were there 13,000 fewer journalists who 
could potentially cover the events unfolding in the financial industry, but it also increased the 
level of competition between the remaining members of the newspaper industry as well. 
Because members of the industry were increasingly fearing for their jobs, they became more 
focused on covering stories that would “sell papers” and were not necessarily focusing on the 
events that needed to be covered. Moreover, as Dean Starkman wrote, 
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The disintegration of the financial media’s own financial underpinnings could not have come at a 
worse time. Low morale, lost expertise, and constant cutbacks, especially in investigative reporting 
– these are not conditions that produce an appetite for confrontation and muckraking (Starkman). 
Thus, the characteristics of the newspaper industry at this time discouraged active 
investigation of the events unfolding in the financial industry.  
Overall, there are a number of factors that have contributed to the inconsistent coverage of 
financial crises. The media’s inherent conflict of interest, both in terms of monetary rewards 
and trading subservience for access, has ultimately resulted in a disservice to the public. The 
public is no longer receiving factual and objective information. Instead, the public now hears 
primarily what corporate America wants it to hear. Furthermore, because journalists dislike 
admitting when they are wrong, the public increasingly receives inaccurate information. In 
addition, the media’s tendency to favor reporting on political events has also hindered the 
coverage of the financial industry. However, although the media are largely at fault for the 
insufficient coverage of financial crises, the audience has contributed to its own ignorance. 
During times of economic prosperity, the public is often complacent and blissfully ignorant. 
The public is more content reaping the benefits of a booming economy than being concerned 
with the potential for a future downturn in the market. Lastly, the recent difficulty of the 
newspaper industry has also severely impacted the strength of the financial media because 
there are fewer experienced journalists who are willing and able to report on the often 
complex on goings of the financial industry. In the end, the poor coverage of financial crises 
cannot solely be blamed on one party; the media and the audience have both played a role.  
WHAT CAN WE DO AS CONSUMERS TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING 
AGAIN? 
There are a number of preventative measures that consumers of the financial press can take in 
order to help prevent this failure from happening again. One of the most crucial preventative 
measures that consumers should take is to increase their level of media literacy. In today’s 
society,  
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We’re continually bombarded with messages from newspapers and magazines, movie and 
television screens, Internet websites, and chat rooms. We have to know how to filter out what we 
don’t need or want and how to access and then interpret, analyze and evaluate what’s useful 
(Trampiets).  
Furthermore, it is increasingly important to be able to interpret, analyze, and evaluate 
information presented by the media because most governments and businesses have extensive 
public relations departments. With these departments, governments and businesses can 
promote the “good news” into the public. As a result, the majority of the information the 
media report as “news” comes directly from public relation departments and press releases. In 
addition, becoming more media literate is also essential in understanding how structural 
features, such as media ownership, influence the information given to the public; media 
outlets often convey information that reflects the interests of the corporation they are owned 
by. Ultimately, “media literacy is about asking smart questions and making smart choices; it’s 
about using media selectively and reflectively” (Trampiets). In doing this, consumers will be 
more accurately informed, and they will be able to better detect propaganda, censorship, bias, 
and the impact of media ownership on coverage.  
Not only is it important for consumers of the financial press to interpret and analyze the 
information presented to them in order to see past the biased information of public relation 
departments, but it is also important because Americans are becoming increasingly 
responsible for their own financial security. Today, there are more Americans investing in the 
stock market than ever before; nearly half of all American households invest. Moreover, since 
the 1980s, the number of individuals investing in mutual funds has increased from one out of 
every 18 to one out of every three people. Thus, having the ability to interpret and analyze the 
financial press is crucial in order to make informed investment decisions. In addition, the 
importance of this ability is further enhanced because more Americans are taking 
responsibility for their retirement needs. Therefore, it is important that individuals make 
informed investment decisions that will enable them to provide for their future.  
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In addition to becoming more media literate, it is also essential that consumers of the financial 
press accept that nothing is truly objective. Objectivity requires strictly “adhering to the 
principals of fairness, factuality and nonpartisanship. It’s an attempt to get all sides of the 
story, and to leave oneself out of it. It’s about being neutral” (Editor). Although reporters are 
well aware of what it takes to remain objective, the objectivity of the media in today’s society 
has greatly diminished. As an Atlanta editor stated, “The more a reporter inserts personality 
and observation, the more objectivity is lost. As soon as the first words are typed, the 
personality of the person at the keyboard comes through, even if just a little bit” (Editor). 
Thus, many reporters are more concerned with “telling a story” and expressing their own 
opinion than remaining neutral and presenting factual information. Furthermore, objectivity is 
also diminished by the information the reporter chooses to leave out, either due to word count 
limitations, accident, or circumstance. Ultimately, as shown by a survey conducted by the 
Sacred Heart University Polling Institute, 67.9% of Americans think that “objective and fair 
journalism is dead” (Lucas). Moreover, only 24.3% of Americans believe all or most of 
reporting, and 86.6% of Americans think that journalists strongly or somewhat have their own 
opinions and attempt to influence public opinion. Overall, “the media as a whole cannot be 
truly objective about any story;” therefore, it is essential that media consumers recognize this 
and take it into consideration when consuming information in order to better facilitate making 
informed financial decisions (Lucas).  
In the end, in order to help prevent future financial crises from occurring it is necessary that 
consumers of the financial press must become more media literate and recognize that no news 
is truly objective. By becoming more media literate, consumers will be able to better detect 
propaganda, censorship, biases, and the effects of media ownership. Subsequently, consumers 
will be able to formulate more accurate opinions and make more precise decisions. In addition 
to becoming more media literate, recognizing that the media is never truly objective will 
further consumers’ ability to make more informed decisions. In the end, it is essential that 
consumers make an effort to become more media literate and to actively recognize that the 
media are not objective in order to prevent financial crises, such as the financial crises of 2008 
and the downfall of Enron, from happening again in the future. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the media’s coverage of the financial crisis of 2008, as well as past crises 
including the downfall of Enron, the burst of the Technology Bubble, and the Savings and 
Loan crisis, has been extremely limited. During these events, the media failed to provide 
accurate coverage, and the minimal coverage that did exist was often biased and delayed. 
However, the media’s failed coverage was not the only factor that contributed to the public’s 
lack of awareness. Factors such as the public’s unwillingness to listen to the media also 
contributed greatly to this phenomenon. Thus, in order to prevent these failures in the future, 
consumers of the financial press must take action. They must become more media literate and 
recognize that no source of information is truly objective. Therefore, in the end, the public’s 
lack of awareness regarding catastrophic events in the financial industry is not the sole fault of 
one party; the media and the public both are both at fault. Thus, in order to prevent this trend 
from continuing, both the media and consumers of the financial press must take preventative 
measures. Ultimately, without the dedication of both parties, this phenomenon will likely 
continue and financial crises will continue to go unnoticed until it is already too late.  
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